

SCIENCE & GOVERNMENT REPORT

12th Year of Publication

The Independent Bulletin of Science Policy

Volume XII, No. 6

P.O. Box 6226A, Washington, D.C. 20015

April 1, 1982

Academy of Sciences Stakes Out a New Role

What's behind all that institutional shaking, headrolling, and reorganizing that's going on at the venerable National Academy of Sciences?

The answer is that Frank Press, nearly one year in the presidency, feels that he's got a grip on the place and has begun to reshape it in terms of what he thinks the Academy should be. Whether the outcome will matter in the real world is a separate question, since the Academy now has plenty of company in its historic role as scientific adviser to the federal government; furthermore, while it retains general respect as the high temple of science, the days are long gone when government and the general public accorded uncritical respect to eminent men of science.

In Press's vision of the Academy of the future, the institution would focus its scholarly resources on big

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issues and eventually get out of the role of job shop for any government agency that wants to hire its prestige. At present, the Academy, with a budget of nearly \$70 million, has a staff of 1100, most of whom service some 7500 outside committee members and consultants who are attached in one way or another to 800 committees, panels, boards and groups. Their activities range from technical advice to the military services to a newly issued report on *Nutrient Requirements of Goats*, a not unworthy subject, but one that could surely be properly attended to at an institution below the honorary peak of American science.

Press would like to see the Academy revert to its early role as a staging area for science's political interests in Washington. Lots of wheeling and dealing aimed at starting or stopping something on the federal scene used to go on at the Academy. It played a role in the genesis of the Manhattan Project, and, in the postwar years, the Academy was the hatchery for big government-financed ventures in oceanography and the space sciences. The late President Philip Handler, who was early on needed by public-interest groups for conducting public business behind closed doors, responded by opening many of the Academy's proceedings to public view and by stressing the importance of "balance" on its study groups. The effect may have been a fairer product, but, in the process, the Academy lost a good deal of its wheeler-dealer prowess.

Press does not assert that it is his aim to restore that aspect, but that's the way it looks from the outside. The first step is to get some unencumbered money—of which the Academy has had very little in recent years. For this purpose, Press has rounded up so far about \$2.7 million in foundation gifts for "self-initiated studies." In addition, at the risk of tying the Academy up with industrial firms that might like to exploit its prestige, he is setting up a "corporate liaison program," under which firms will be asked to contribute no-strings money to support studies of general interest to their sectors of the economy. In return for buying in, they'll receive briefings and be kept abreast of the work they're assisting. Have organized labor and public-interest groups been approached to see whether they might like to take part in this relationship? The answer is: Not so far.

To link up the Academy to Washington's power
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In Brief

It will take at least \$1 billion—maybe as much as \$3 billion—to update research instrumentation in the nation's university laboratories, according to estimates by a federal inter-agency task force. The Reagan Administration's contribution so far has been a \$30-million item in the Defense budget for helping academe buy new equipment, plus an 11.5-percent boost in NSF funds for instruments, to a total of \$95 million. No signs yet of restoring the special \$75-million instrument fund that Reagan cut out of Carter's last budget.

Meanwhile, as reductions in force hit many of the big national laboratories, the White House science office has ordered yet another study of the difficult question of what to do with those elephantine, though politically well-connected, institutions. The study is to be headed by David Packard, Chairman of Hewlett-Packard, and will be carried out under the auspices of the newly established White House Science Council.

Democracy Comes to the IEEE: Soviet-style one-candidate elections have been abandoned by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, which, with some 220,000 members, may be the largest professional society in the world. An announcement from IEEE says that from now on, IEEE voters will be offered two candidates for the top offices. The change is attributed to "membership requests and surveys supporting a change in the nomination process."

Several Senior Staff Members on Way Out at Academy

Several senior staff changes are in the works at the National Academy of Sciences.

Soon to leave, SGR has been informed, is Micah H. Naftalin, an 11-year veteran of the Academy who last year left the top staff post on the NAS Assembly of Engineering to become Executive Director of the Committee on Science and Public Policy. Naftalin is an attorney by training; Press is said to feel that the Committee job requires a scientific background.

Two other senior staffers on the way out are Edward Epremian, Executive Director of the Commission on Sociotechnical Systems, and Wallace D. Bowman, Executive Director of the Commission on Natural Resources.

Charles K. Reed is retiring as Executive Director of the Assembly of Mathematical and Physical Sciences; he'll continue to serve, however, under the title of "senior adviser" when the Assembly resurfaces as a "Commission" under a reorganization scheme that Press will present to the NAS Council at the annual meeting this month.

Also leaving will be Irwin Goodwin, Associate Director for Reports and Publications at the Assembly of Engineering. Goodwin a former *Newsweek* correspondent, joined the NAS staff in 1973, and after a stint as a speech writer for Robert Seamans, President of the National Academy of Engineering, presided over many major reports, including the recently issued report on health and environmental effects of diesel passenger cars.

While headrollings were expected to follow the 12-year presidency of the late Philip Handler, several of these shifts have come with an abruptness—and, some say, absence of tact—that has raised the normally high level of anxious rumormongering in the

NAS bureaucracy. The mood is, of course, worsened by the soggy state of the job market in the Washington area.

"Read the Report"

While it is difficult to evaluate the effects of the National Academy of Sciences' behind-the-scenes maneuverings in Washington, its public activities offer at least an opportunity for observation.

A case in point involves the Academy's long-in-the-works report on *Marijuana and Health*, released February 26 and extensively covered by major news organizations. From the perspective of public benefit from the report, the major difficulty was that its scientifically cautious on-the-one-hand, on-the-other-hand approach provided little guidance on the obviously compelling question of whether marijuana is harmful to health. Reporters repeatedly asked the chairman of the panel that produced the report, Arnold S. Relman, Editor of the *New England Journal of Medicine*, how he would respond if someone asked whether marijuana use is safe. Relman replied, "I'd advise him to read the report"—a point that he made several times.

What efforts has the Academy made to assist with that suggestion? The answer is that, apart from organizing the well-attended press conference, the Academy has been passive in getting the report to the public. The print order was 2684 copies, of which 300 were distributed without charge to members of the press and other persons. As of March 22, 614 had been sold at \$11.25 each, through mail or phone orders to the Academy—which is the only place where it is available for sale.

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channels, Press has initiated evening meetings with legislative and executive staff members and various interest groups on the Washington scene. Meetings have been held on nitrates and ability testing; in May, there will be one on primary and secondary education. A big meeting last October, for the purpose of confronting Reagan Administration officials on proposed budget cuts for basic research, is cited as an example of the new style of operation (SGR Vol. XI, No. 18).

In addition, Press has been holding regional meetings of Academy members—six so far—at which he discusses current national issues of interest to the scientific community, among them budgets, Soviet-American relations, and the festering problem of scientific

freedom and national security.

On the last one, Press has been especially active, both out front and behind the scenes. In recent weeks, he has set up a special committee, chaired by Dale Corson, Professor and President Emeritus of Cornell University, to examine the national security aspects of university-based research. Meanwhile, Press has been touching base with various Administration officials, including Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, and William P. Clark, the President's National Security Adviser.

The NAS presidency is, in many respects, one of the cushiest positions in the nation's capital. It comes with ample pay—Press is said to have insisted on \$150,000 a year, but SGR got a flat "no" when it asked how much

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Administration Challenged on Nuclear Sales

Ever since the Atoms for Peace conferences in the early 1950s, the US has sought to sell nuclear technology abroad without aiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Carter Administration collided with these conflicting goals when it tried to discourage proliferation by imposing stiff unilateral conditions on foreign sales of US nuclear technology and materials. In return, it was accused of attempting to bully less powerful nations into accepting its point of view. Now the Reagan Administration appears to be experiencing the same problem in reverse: Its efforts to come to the aid of the economically sinking nuclear industry by reducing constraints on exports have led to the accusation that safety is being sacrificed to international commerce, charges that contain a political potential which Congress has not been slow to exploit.

The most prominent casualty of this dilemma so far has been James Malone, who has been removed from his position as Assistant Secretary of State responsible for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). In addition to this post, Malone, who had been General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under the Nixon Administration, had held two additional jobs, both occupied by separate individuals under President Carter. One involved responsibility for nuclear exports and nonproliferation policy, previously filled by Gerard Smith; the other was as head of the US delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference, a position which had been held by Elliot Richardson.

Malone will retain his responsibility for the Law of the Sea negotiations, which had already been taking up

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he receives; there's also a presidential apartment at the Watergate, and a car and chauffeur. The Academy remains a prestigious institution and commands attention, even if not as much as before. What remains to unfold is whether it can make any difference in an Administration that has its own ideas about the cultivation and application of science.—DSG

a large amount of his time. His removal from OES is also rumored to be related to internal unhappiness over his management of the Bureau, a job whose ambiguous mix of diplomatic and technical responsibilities has defeated several previous incumbents.

But it is also being widely said on Capitol Hill that Malone's job switch was in large part prompted by his failure to achieve wider political backing for legislative changes that would lift some of the burdens that the nuclear industry complains were loaded on to it by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978. This legislation, for example, requires that US nuclear technology and materials can be exported only to those countries whose nuclear facilities are subject to international safeguards, an immediate barrier to trade with potential customers such as Brazil and Argentina, which have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and do not therefore automatically come under the scope of safeguards administered through the International Atomic Energy Authority, in Vienna (IAEA).

Contrary to early press reports, the criticism of Malone was not that he had been reluctant to push for radical changes in export regulations, but that he had failed so far to come up with a reformulation that was likely to be accepted by Congress. During Malone's nomination hearings, he was closely questioned by supporters of the Carter approach, in particular Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio), about his work as a private attorney on behalf of nuclear companies in Japan and Taiwan. Malone denied that these links were likely to affect his judgment on non-proliferation policy issues, and agreed to withdraw from involvement in any decisions that could involve his previous clients. However, his links to the nuclear industry in these two countries, together with recommendations for changes in nuclear export policy (leaked to the *Washington Post* last October) which closely reflected many of the revisions that the industry had been pressing for, are said—at least by the Administration's critics—to have weakened Malone's credibility in Capitol Hill negotiations about amending the NNPA.

While the reasons for Malone's departure remain

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ISSN 0048-9581

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Independently published by Science & Government Report, Inc., twice monthly, except once in January, June & July. Annual Subscription: Institutions, \$127.50 (two years, \$220.00); individuals, \$55.00 (two years, \$95.00). Editorial offices at 3736 Kanawha St. N.W., Washington, DC 20015. Tel. (202) 244-4135. Second-class postage paid at Washington, DC. Please address all subscription correspondence to Box 6226A, Northwest Station, Washington, DC 20015. Reproduction without permission is prohibited. SGR is available on Xerox University Microfilms. Claims for missing back issues will be filled without charge if made within six months of publication date.

...Doubts Raised About Safeguards Program

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somewhat unclear, there is a growing feeling that it will result in responsibility for non-proliferation policy falling more directly into the hands of Richard T. Kennedy, the Under Secretary for Management. Kennedy was a Colonel in the US Army before moving to the staff of the National Security Council, where he served under Henry Kissinger during the Nixon Administration. He subsequently served as one of the five members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which he left when his term expired in 1980.

Kennedy has already taken over *de facto* many of Malone's responsibilities for nuclear issues. He is also head of the US delegation to the IAEA, a position which has already brought him into conflict with members of both Congress and the NRC. The reason for this is relatively straightforward. Those in favor of a strong domestic non-proliferation policy, including the needs for additional controls on top of those mandated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have based their arguments partly on the alleged shortcomings of the IAEA. They claim that the IAEA's inability to provide adequate protection against the diversion of nuclear materials from civilian to military purposes requires strong extra anti-proliferation measures by supplier countries such as the US. In contrast, the nuclear industry has looked at the IAEA as a source of assurance that international nuclear trade is being carried out solely for peaceful purposes.

Tensions over the role of the IAEA and the adequacy of its safeguard system came to a head last March 18 at a joint hearing of the International Security and Scientific Affairs Subcommittee and the International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee, of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The principal source of the tension was disagreement between State Department officials on the one hand, and members of the NRC on the other, about the proper criteria for judging the adequacy of IAEA safeguards.

The State Department tends to see this as a political judgment based not only on an evaluation of whether or not the IAEA is doing its job properly, but on how the IAEA complements other ways of checking safeguards. The NRC, in contrast, is required under the terms of the Non-Proliferation Act to vouch that safeguards are being applied to facilities receiving US exports. And it views the task through the eyes of regulators directly responsible to Congress, interpreting it as a task based on evaluation of technical data, in isolation from political considerations.

Speaking on behalf of the State Department, Under Secretary Kennedy, Walter Rostow, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Roger

Kirk, Deputy US Representative to the IAEA, presented a united front in defending the IAEA, but stressed that the adequacy of non-proliferation efforts should not be based on the evaluation of safeguards alone. "IAEA safeguards do not prevent diversion. They do not serve to apprehend a diverter. They do not allow for searches for clandestine materials or facilities," said Rostow. "In my view, it is just as wrong to overestimate the importance of safeguards in nuclear commerce as it is to denigrate the system for not accomplishing objectives for which it was not designed."

Nunzio Palladino, the Chairman of the NRC, also stated that it was important not to exaggerate the importance of safeguards. But he also stressed some of the weaknesses of the current system. "As the Commission has stated on a number of occasions, although we do receive substantial amounts of information of a more general nature, including some detailed information on the application of safeguards at some types of facilities, the NRC receives little specific information about the application of IAEA safeguards in particular countries or at specific facilities. Accordingly, as a general matter, we do not know whether the IAEA is achieving its safeguards objectives in a specific country or at a specific facility. At the same time, we have enough information to be concerned that the IAEA safeguards system would not detect a diversion of significant quantities in a timely manner in at least one type of facility."

The different perspectives emerged most sharply in an exchange between Kennedy and NRC Commissioner Peter Bradford, spending his last day with the Commission. It was stimulated by an exchange of letters be-

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OSTP Gets New Spokesman

Bruce R. Abell, head of the Communications Resources Branch at the National Science Foundation, has been assigned to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). Effective March 22, he took the place of Stanley D. Schneider as chief press contact and speech writer for the OSTP Director. Schneider, who was with OSTP since 1976, has joined Bell Labs as Director of "Executive Speeches," of which there are expected to be more when Bell Labs gets more corporate swat as a result of the AT&T antitrust split-up.

The bureaucratic economics of the succession illustrates that agency rank hath its privileges. Whereas Schneider was on the OSTP payroll, his replacement, though working at and for OSTP, will be officially "on detail" from the Foundation and his salary will come out of the NSF budget.

...Data Denied Congressional Committees

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tween the NRC and Congressman Richard Ottinger (D-NY), Chairman of the House Science and Technology Committee's Energy Conservation and Power Subcommittee, which oversees the NRC. Last November, Ottinger asked the NRC's views on how well it had been able to meet its responsibilities for checking IAEA safeguards. The topic has generated controversy since last year's Israeli raid on the Iraq reactor, which the IAEA had apparently given a clean bill of health, but which the Israelis claimed was engaged in the clandestine production of weapons-grade material. In a reply received three months later, on March 5, the NRC repeated its earlier concern about the inherent limitations of the safeguard system, pointing out several weaknesses.

What concerned Bradford was not only the information that the NRC's letter contained, but the fact that various parts of its reply—even including the text of one of the questions that Ottinger had asked—had been deleted by the State Department on national security grounds. This led Bradford, in a prepared statement, to complain that "the Congress' ability to appraise [the adequacy of safeguards applied to US exports] is currently being severely undercut by the quality and untimeliness of the information provided...from the Executive Branch." He testified that the Congress had not been receiving the information that it needed and had asked for over the past six or seven months. "When I compare material that I have seen with what your Committee staffs tell me that they have been told, the extent of the gap is dramatic." He claimed that some of the

NRC responses had been "censored" by the Executive Branch, even though they would not have given away intelligence sources and methods. "The issue here is not the revelation of classified information...You have been seeking this information for a long time from the Executive Branch. You have not been getting it, and you will have great difficulty reviewing Criterion 1 of the NNPA [the section which deals with NRC review of IAEA safeguards] without it."

Stating that the road to Three Mile Island had been paved with similar self-delusions over the effectiveness of safety precautions, Bradford concluded: "The self-reinforcing processes of secrecy and self-delusion that have long troubled nuclear energy and governmental regulation in general are undermining the prospects for improvement here."

Ottinger rubbed salt into the wound by accusing the IAEA and the State Department of concealing some of the flaws in the current safeguard system. "There has been a systematic cover-up of inadequacies by the State Department," Ottinger complained. "The Executive Branch has refused to permit responses to some of the questions that we ask to be transmitted to us, even in classified form. Even a report prepared for the NRC by Emanuel Morgan [an ex-IAEA inspector who had complained about the inadequacy of safeguards] has been classified, even though it appeared in full in the November 23 issue of *Nuclear Fuel*. My staff tried to get hold of the annual report of the IAEA, but we were told that that is also classified."

"We resent the use of the word cover-up," Kennedy replied angrily. "There will not be a cover-up by the Executive Branch or by the IAEA." Referring to the "serious allegations" in Bradford's statement, Kennedy said that there was "no-one on the State payroll who performs a censorship function. Censorship does not occur in the Executive Branch." Kennedy added that he would find out why some of the answers to Ottinger's questions had been classified. He was informed by aides at the hearing that the Central Intelligence Agency, at whose request some of the information about methods for checking on the adequacy of safeguards had been withheld from the NRC's reply, had now said that it was willing to brief Ottinger.

Rostow joined in the rejection of Bradford's and Ottinger's allegations, denying the charges of censorship and cover-up. "Even if one accepts some of the charges against the IAEA and the adequacy of its current safeguards, where does it lead? To the conclusion that we should stop US nuclear exports and stop cooperation with key industrial nations, or to an intensification of our efforts to prevent proliferation? I argue that cutting

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NSF Awards Robotics Grant

A robotics program at the University of Rhode Island has been approved for full-fledged status in the National Science Foundation's exclusive program of government-assisted academic-industrial cooperation. Under the program, NSF will provide the university with a total of \$700,400 over four years, while industrial firms will put up \$750,000 in the first year and will replace all NSF support within four years.

The venture, titled the University/Industry Cooperative Center for Robotics, is located on the university's Kingston campus, and is headed by John Birk and Robert B. Kelley, professors of electrical engineering. It is the sixth established so far in the NSF program. Others are at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, computer graphics; University of Massachusetts, polymers; Ohio State, welding, and Case Western Reserve, applied polymers. A center at MIT for polymer processing became self-sufficient in 1978.

...Rostow Says Past Policies Unrealistic

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off exports would be an obsolete approach, and could even encourage other nations to move in the wrong direction."

Bradford said he agreed with efforts to strengthen the IAEA as being "the only realistic course" in current circumstances. But he added: "I agree about the US not being in a position to exercise technological leverage, but there is a difference between doing what we can to restrain other countries, and being enthusiastic about the same technology in the US and in other nuclear countries, as we seem to be doing by supporting the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel." Here he was referring to the Administration's promise that it will soon come up with a new policy statement on its attitude towards the use of plutonium in the nuclear fuel cycle, the issue on which the Carter Administration took a particularly hard stand.

Rostow's statement indicated the general approach that this statement is likely to take. "The US is commit-

ted to working with other states in a coordinated effort to inhibit the transfer of sensitive nuclear material, equipment or technology where the danger of proliferation exists. Civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development in countries with advanced nuclear programs are special instances of this problem," Rostow said. "We have tended to view such issues through the spectacles of the past. We must recognize that such activities in the stable industrial democracies simply do not in themselves present a proliferation risk. Where there is no such risk, President Reagan recognizes that we cannot and should not attempt to set back civil reprocessing or breeder reactor development. To suppose that these aspects of the real world are in conflict with our non-proliferation goals is to invite sterile friction based on the illusion of US omnipotence in nuclear affairs."

The plutonium statement, expected from the White House within the next few weeks, is likely to become a

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Support of Basic Research by Federal Agencies

(Budget Authority in millions)

	FY 1972 Actual	FY 1980 Actual	FY 1981 Actual	FY 1982 Est.	FY 1983 Est.	% Change FY 81-83 Current \$	% Change FY 81-83 Constant \$
HHS	\$ 626	\$1762	\$1954	\$1999	\$2069	+ 5.9%	- 9.0%
(NIH)	(546)	(1644)	(1768)	(1839)	(1897)	(+ 7.3%)	(- 7.8%)
NSF	368	830	879	910	984	+ 11.9%	- 3.8%
Defense-Military	328	552	610	683	828	+ 35.7%	+ 16.6%
Energy	268	523	597	647	741	+ 24.1%	+ 6.6%
NASA	332	559	532	580	682	+ 28.2%	+ 10.2%
Agriculture	137	280	319	330	359	+ 12.5%	- 3.3%
Interior	—	72	79	73	67	- 15.2%	- 27.1%
Smithsonian	—	41	45	45	51	+ 13.3%	- 2.6%
Commerce	—	31	16	18	21	+ 31.3%	+ 12.8%
VA	—	14	15	13	14	- 6.7%	- 19.8%
Education	—	18	17	14	14	- 17.6%	- 29.2%
EPA	—	13	12	11	9	- 25.0%	- 35.6%
Other	138	21	32	23	29	- 9.4%	- 22.1%
Total Basic Research							
Current Dollars	\$2197	\$4716	\$5107	\$5346	\$5868	+ 14.9%	
Constant FY 1972 Dollars	(2197)	(2528)	(2431)	(2336)	(2400)		- 1.3%

Intersociety Preliminary Analyses of R&D in the FY 1983 Budget provides a uniquely clear and valuable examination of federal financial involvement in R&D. The seventh in an annual series prepared by the American Association for the Advancement of Science in collaboration with 15 other professional societies, it shows that R&D is up in "real" terms, but mainly because of a big boost in Defense funds; between FY 81-83, total real federal support for basic research declined by 1.3 percent, with NIH down 7.8 percent and NSF down 3.8

percent during the two-year period. The AAAS report, 145 pages, includes government-wide as well as agency-by-agency analyses of past and proposed R&D spending. The basic document for the AAAS' annual R&D Policy Colloquium, June 23-24 at the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, the *Analyses of R&D* is available for \$8 per copy from: Office of Public Sector Programs, AAAS, 1776 Massachusetts Ave. Nw., Washington, D.C. 20036; tel. (202) 467-4310. The chart above is from the report.

Confusion Reigns on R&D “Export Controls”

A characteristically Reaganite confusion has settled upon what Washington research officials refer to as the “export controls” problem—their euphemistic term for sporadic efforts by the cave-dwelling wing of the Administration to clamp secrecy rules on academic research. But some clarity is becoming available on the distribution of the heavies and the rationalists in this increasingly nasty area of controversy.

The term export controls derives from claims by the State Department that scientific research, even when unclassified, may come under the same national security rules that govern the export of items of national security value.

The State Department has used this legalistic gimmick in attempts to badger several universities into restricting the access of foreign students and visitors. And Admiral Bobby Inman, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has strongly suggested that academe police itself to restrict the circulation of sensitive material, or, as he put it, face “a tidal wave” of

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symbolic focus for protagonists on both sides of the nuclear export question—just as it did under the Carter Administration. Widespread criticism has already been expressed of the Administration’s suggestion that civil reactor waste might be used to produce the extra plutonium which will be required for a massive build-up in nuclear weapons, a move which critics argue would set an unfortunate international precedent for lowering the barrier between the civilian and the military applications of nuclear technology. At the same time, even members of the Administration concede that safeguards against the diversion of plutonium from reprocessing or enrichment plants will be more difficult to enforce than those applied to operations using conventional nuclear fuels.

Democrats in both houses are ready to make a political issue of plutonium policy. Ottinger’s sharp questioning of the State Department representatives at last month’s meeting was challenged by Rep. Jonathan Bingham (D-NY), Chairman of the International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee, who argued that issue fell into his jurisdiction, rather than Ottinger’s. Yet this is unlikely to deter Ottinger and other liberal Democrats from pursuing the subject. In the Senate, John Glenn and Gary Hart (D-Colo.) both possible contenders for the 1984 presidential elections, have also picked proliferation policy in general—and the international uses of plutonium in particular—as one of the sticks with which they intend to harrass Mr. Reagan in the months ahead.—DD

political and popular resentment (SGR Vol. XII, No. 1).

Inman, who is smooth-talking and gracious, comes across, even to those who oppose his notions, as reasonable and eager to arrive at a balanced position.

But within federal agencies, it is not difficult to find senior research administration who feel that the Admiral, for all his do-it-yourself advice to academe, has been behaving like a bull in a china shop. None of these skeptics wants to take on the powerful CIA man in open conflict, but in private they have candidly expressed their reservations. This applies to officials with civilian as well as military agencies.

In the latter category, one administrator told SGR, “We have no interest in Inman’s suggestion” to broaden the self-policing system to all the sciences, as the Admiral proposed last January in a talk to the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Within the Defense Department, a hardline approach on “export controls” is attributed to policymaking civilians in the International Security Affairs wing of the Department. But among those responsible for research and development, the security-obsessed curtain pullers are looked upon with serious concern.

Thus, Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, recently cautioned the House Armed Services Committee about the need for selectivity in restricting scientific communication. “We might be throwing the baby out with the bath water if we are not careful about being very deliberate on how we apply certain security measures to different parts of our work,” he said.

DeLauer added that “we have been too concerned about protecting the invention and not concerned enough about creating an environment that permits us to make the investment to put it into manufacturing and availability.” In regard to sub-micron technology, he said, “One of the things I am not too concerned about in some cases is with the Soviets just knowing about it. I am concerned about their getting their hands on it in a finished form. But they are not noted for putting things into production.”

On the critical question of what’s a university to do about foreigners and possibly sensitive, though unclassified, research, the response from one senior official was that “at present, there are no explicit rules, and everyone will have to make up their own rules.”

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Biomedical Researchers Weigh Lobbying Drive

Washington-based lobbyists for the biomedical community are looking into organizing a month-long public-relations campaign next year against the Reagan Administration's budgetary treatment of the health sciences and medical education.

The proposed campaign, tentatively scheduled for April 1983, is under the care of the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), which is one of the deftest of the many science- and education-related representational organizations in the capital. The conception of the campaign is credited to Claude Migeon, Professor of Pediatrics at Johns Hopkins University, who, according to an AAMC announcement, suggested that the Association take "the lead in this activity and...act as a coordinator of various efforts that could be conducted at the medical schools"—of which the AAMC represents all 126 in the US.

The proposed effort being an unprecedented one, the AAMC has chosen to move cautiously by directing its staff to scout the depth of interest throughout the biomedical community and to get estimates on the costs for a national public relations campaign. On the first item, returns are being awaited from letters sent last month to some 90 organizations; inquiries to several New York PR firms have produced estimates ranging up to \$500,000.

The national campaign, according to AAMC President John A.D. Cooper's weekly report to Association members, would employ a public relations firm to "produce television and radio spot announcements designed to be used initially as public service announcements by the major networks. These announcements would also be made available to the medical schools for use locally

across the country. The campaign would also encompass leading scientists appearing on national television shows; national publications printing stories about medical advances made possible through research; the development of a central theme for the campaign; the establishment of a national logo and the coordination of efforts by the medical schools to promote medical research in their states and local communities."

Cooper added that "It is envisioned that the medical schools would feature a variety of public awareness programs such as holding open houses and encouraging faculty to discuss their research efforts on local television talk shows and appear before civic luncheon groups."

The immediate inspiration for the campaign is the groundlosing budget that the Reagan Administration has proposed for the National Institutes of Health—up a mere 2.7 percent in the fiscal 1983 budget—plus the devastation that the medical schools foresee if student loans are eliminated. Lurking there, too, is the feeling that public interest has waned "because there's been no spectacular breakthrough in recent years," according to Charles Fentress, the AAMC's Director of public relations.

A particularly nice touch to the proposed campaign calls for asking President Reagan to declare April 1983 as National Medical Research Month. "If President Reagan should decline to make such a proclamation," AAMC President Cooper wrote to his member organizations, "then there remains the possibility that the Congress could designate a medical research month by the passage of a joint resolution."

Science & Government Report
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